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NOTES
AMMUNITION FOR VICTIMS OF SATURDAY NIGHT
SPECIALS: MANUFACTURER LIABILITY UNDER
KELLEY V. R.G. INDUSTRIES, INC.
Criminals in the United States use handguns more frequently than any
other weapon in the perpetration of homicides and robberies.' In recent years,
in nearly half of all homicides the murder weapon was a handgun. 2 Despite the
widespread criminal use of handguns, over two and one-half million new
handguns enter American markets each year,3 and Congress has refused to
pass legislation to implement tighter handgun control. 4 Survivors of handgun
shootings and families of victims currently are appealing to the courts to
begin clearing the streets of handguns.5 Typically, the victims or their
representatives sue the manufacturer and distributor of the handgun used
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1985 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRImE REPORTS 10 (handguns used
in 43076 of all murders in 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1985 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]; Turley &
Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 285, 306 (1983)
(handguns used in 23% of all aggravated assaults and 40%7o of all robberies in 1979).
2. See 1985 UNIFORM CRIM:E REPORTS, supra note 1, at 10 (handguns used in 43% of all
murders in 1984); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1981 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 10 (handguns
used in 50% of all murders in 1981). Criminals used handguns to murder 10,728 persons in the
United States in 1979, but only 8 persons in Great Britain, 48 persons in Japan, 21 persons in
Sweden and 42 persons in West Germany during the same year. P. SHIELDS, GUNS DON'T DIE-
PEOPLE Do 63-69 (1981).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS STATISTICS
(1980), reprinted in Federal Regulations of Firearms, REPORT TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.
6 (1982) (2,500,000 nonmilitary handguns produced for sale in 1980). In 1981 Americans owned
between 40 and 60 million handguns. See P. SHIELDS, supra note 2, at 37 (1981). Although
handguns comprise less than 20% of all firearms in the United States, in 1981 handguns were
involved in 907o of all firearm deaths and injuries. Peer, McGuire & Clausen, Taking Aim at
Handguns, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982 at 42.
4. See Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take
Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 474 (1983) (recognizing that intent of
litigation instituted against gun manufacturers is to effect handgun control through courts
because legislative appeals have failed); Speiser, Disarming the Handgun Problem by Directly
Suing Arms Makers, Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1981, at 29, col. I (claiming that paralysis of legislative,
administrative and police remedies to reduce handgun crime requires extending tort law to
control handgun violence).
5. See Halbrook, Tort Liabilityfor the Manufacture, Sale, and Ownership of Handguns?,
6 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 351 (1983) (suits against manufacturers of handguns used in crime is
new strategy to ban handgun ownership by citizens); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims
of Handgun Crime: A Common-Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 771 (1983) (growing
number of suits initiated attempting to impose liability on manufacturers of handguns used in
crime [hereinafter cited as Note, Common-Law Approach]; Note, Legal Limits of a Handgun
Manufacturer's Liability for the Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. REv. 830, 834
(1984) (onslaught of litigation against handgun manufacturers currently taking place) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Legal Limits]; Suits Target Handgun Makers, Newsweek, Aug. 2, 1982, at 42
(predicted that litigants would file over 200 lawsuits against manufacturers of handguns used in
crime by end of 1984).
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against the victim and seek imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer
and distributor through an abnormally dangerous activity6 or unreasonably
dangerous product theory.7 The victims often assert that the manufacture
and distribution of handguns constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity
and that liability for injuries from handguns should follow, despite the level
of care exercised by the manufacturers and distributors.8 Alternatively, the
victims claim that a handgun is an unreasonably dangerous product and that
courts should hold the manufacturer and distributor of a handgun strictly
liable for injuries resulting from the use or misuse of the product.9 The
handgun manufacturers and distributors generally win on summary judgment
or on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.' 0 The recent decision of Maryland's highest court in Kelley v.
R.G. Industries, Inc.," however, may reverse the trend of decisions in favor
of manufacturers and distributors, at least in suits by victims of "Saturday
Night Specials."' 2 Although rejecting the application of strict liability under
6. See Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 498 (some members of plaintiffs' bar seek to
impose liability upon gun manufacturers through abnormally dangerous activity theory of strict
liability); see also infra notes 16-52 and accompanying text (discussion of handgun manufacturer
liability under abnormally dangerous activity theory of strict liability).
7. See Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1912, 1912 (1984)
(noting that shooting victims or their survivors have sued handgun manufacturers under theory
of unreasonably dangerous products); see also infra notes 53-99 and accompanying text
(discussing applicability of unreasonably dangerous products theory in suits against manufac-
turers and distributors of handguns used in crime).
8. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs
argued that production and distribution of handguns is abnormally dangerous activity warranting
strict liability recovery by victims of handgun crime); Martin v. Harrington and Richardson,
Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,
-, 704 P.2d 118, 120 (1985); see also infra notes 16-52 and accompanying text (discussion of
handgun manufacturer liability under abnormally dangerous activity theory).
9. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs
argued that handguns were unreasonably dangerous products warranting strict liability recovery
by victims of handgun crime); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (same); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642,-, 477 N.E.2d
1293, 1297 (1985) (same); see also infra notes 53-99 and accompanying text (discussion of
applicability of unreasonably dangerous products theory in suits against manufacturers and
distributors of handguns used in crime).
10. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (7th
Cir. 1984) (granting handgun manufacturer's motion for summary judgment); Bennet v.
Cincinnati Checker Cab. Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (same); Riordan v.
International Armament Corp., 132 I1. App.3d 643,__-_, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (1985)
(granting handgun manufacturer's motion to dismiss for failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted). But see Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 200-04 (E.D. La.
1983) (denying handgun manufacturer's summary judgment motion), rev'd sub nom. Perkins
v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
11. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
12. See id. at 144-61, 497 A.2d at 1153-61 (recognizing cause of action against Saturday
Night Special manufacturers and distributors); infra notes 100-205 and accompanying text (discussing
Kelley court's recognition of shooting victims' cause of action against Saturday Night Special
manufacturers and distributors). The term "Saturday Night Special" supposedly originated in
Detroit when lawmen began noticing that weekend shootings in the city often involved small,
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an abnormally dangerous activity 3 or unreasonably dangerous product the-
ory,' 4 the Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley found that a victim of the
criminal misuse of a handgun could maintain an action against the manu-
facturer and distributor of the handgun if the handgun fits into a distinct
class of small, inexpensive, and poorly crafted handguns commonly known
as Saturday Night Specials."
Victims of handgun crime or their representatives often sue the manu-
facturer and distributor of the handgun used against the victim under the
theory that the manufacture and distribution of handguns is an abnormally
dangerous activity.' 6 In asserting that the manufacture and distribution of
handguns is an abnormally dangerous activity, the plaintiffs' claims have
paralleled sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.7
Section 519 recommends the imposition of liability for any harm caused by
carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity, regardless of the care exercised
to prevent the harm.' To determine whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous, section 520 recommends an examination of the societal value of
the activity, the seriousness of the harm threatened by the activity, the extent
to which the activity is not a matter of common usage, and a determination
of whether the activity is natural and appropriate for the locality in which
the activity occurs.' 9 Section 520 recommends balancing the considerations
to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous and further in-
cheap handguns. See 118 CONG. REC. 21,27029 (1972). Although Detroit had enacted strict laws
concerning handgun sales, one hour away in Toledo, purchasers easily could buy inexpensive
handguns and return to Detroit to use the weapon in weekend criminal activity. R. SHERRILL,
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 98 (1973).
13. See 304 Md. at 132-34, 497 A.2d at 1147 (denying strict liability recovery under
abnormally dangerous activity theory because court found that manufacture and distribution of
handguns was not land-related activity); see also infra notes 16-52 and accompanying text
(discussing inapplicability of abnormally dangerous activity theory in suits against manufacturers
and distributors of handguns subsequently used in crime).
14. See 304 Md. at 132-39, 497 A.2d at 1147-50 (denying strict liability recovery under
unreasonably dangerous product theory because court found no defect in handgun that criminal
used to shoot plaintiff); see also infra notes 53-99 and accompanying text (discussing unreason-
ably dangerous product theory in suits against handgun manufacturers and distributors).
15. See 304 Md. at 144-61, 497 A.2d at 1153-61 (recognizing cause of action against
Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors); infra notes 100-205 and accompanying
text (discussing Kelley court's recognition of shooting victims' cause of action against Saturday
Night Special manufacturers and distributors).
16. See supra note 8 (cases in which victims of handgun crime have sued manufacturer
or distributor of handgun under abnormally dangerous activity theory).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1976) (recommending imposition of
strict liability for injuries caused by abnormally dangerous activities); see, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265 n.43 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff alleged that handgun manufacture
and distribution was abnormally dangerous activity under §§ 519-20 of Restatement (Second)
of Torts); Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (same);
Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 132-33, 497 A.2d 1143, 1146-47 (same); Burkett v.
Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,__., 704 P.2d 118, 119 (1985) (same).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976).
19. Id. § 520.
1986] 1317
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
structs that no single consideration is dispositive.2 Despite the balancing
approach of the Second Restatement, the comments to section 520 emphasize
the importance of the locality of the activity in ascertaining whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous. 2' The doctrine of abnormally dangerous or
ultrahazardous activity originated in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,
22
and English courts and Parliament have limited application of the doctrine
to activity that is unduly dangerous and inappropriate because of the nature
of the place in which a party carries on the activity. 23 Similarly, American
courts have applied the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine only when
the activity carried on is not appropriate to the place in which the activity
occurs. 24 Although courts have permitted recovery under an abnormally
20. See id. § 520 comment f (in determining whether activity is abnormally dangerous,
any one consideration in § 520 is not necessarily dispositive).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comments c, e, f, g, h, j, k (1976)
(emphasizing locality considerations in determining existence of abnormally dangerous activity);
see also Note, Legal Limits, supra note 5, at 843-44 (comments to Restatement (Second) of
Torts consistently stress importance of locality where activity maintained). The First Restatement
of Torts did not support the subsequent findings of courts that an activity is only ultrahazardous
in relation to the place in which the activity occurs. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-20
(1938) (recommending strict liability recovery for persons injured by ultrahazardous activities).
The First Restatement recommended that one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity should
be liable to anyone harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity despite the care
exercised to prevent the harm. Id. § 519. Under § 519 of the First Restatement, liability results,
without considering any negligence on the part of the person carrying on the activity, because
the activity carries with it some element of unpreventable danger. Id. § 519 comment b. Section
520 of the First Restatement defined an ultrahazardous activity as an activity that necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to others which the party carrying on the activity cannot
eliminate and an activity that is not a matter of common usage. Id. § 520. Neither the provisions
of the First Restatement nor the comments to sections 519 and 520 suggested examining the
activity in relation to its surroundings. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 77, at 527 (3d ed.
1964) (discussing Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine in Restatement of Torts). Arguably, the First
Restatement fell short of the abnormally dangerous activity rule as it evolved in England by
failing to emphasize the importance of locality in identifying an abnormally dangerous activity.
Id.
22. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, I L.R. Ex. 265 (1966), aff'd, 3
L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868). In Rylands v. Fletcher, a property owner sued the owners of a mill
when water from a reservoir that they had constructed on their land broke through into a shaft
of an abandoned coal mine and flooded the adjacent coal mines belonging to the plaintiff. 3
L.R.-H.L. at 331. The House of Lords found that the mill owners were liable because the
reservoir constituted an unnatural use of the land. 3 L.R.-H.L. at 338.
23. See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 522 (explaining emergence of rule from Rylands
v. Fletcher that one who damages another by activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to
place carried on, in light of character of place and surroundings, is liable to one harmed).
24. Id. at 527; see, e.g., New Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Ferguson, 134 Colo. 502,.
-, 307 P.2d 479, 482 (1957) (company operating dam to divert irrigation water from river into
ditch not liable to owners of flooded property absent showing of proximate cause because dam
was in natural bed of river); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51, 61 (Mo. App. 1932) (filling station
owner and operator not liable for leakage of gasoline from tanks into neighboring landowner's
well, absent negligence, because storage of gasoline is not unnatural use of land); Hudson v.
Peavy Oil Co., 279 Or. 3,.., 566 P.2d 175, 178 (1977) (property owner denied recovery
against service station for seepage of gasoline from underground storage tanks because under-
ground storage of gasoline was not extraordinary, exceptional, or unusual in that location).
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dangerous activity theory of strict liability in cases involving property damage
caused by pile driving2 and oil drilling, 26 courts have denied recovery under
an abnormally dangerous activity theory in cases involving damage resulting
from ordinary building construction 27 and from a dam in the natural bed of
a river. 21 Courts and commentators distinguish the latter cases by character-
izing the activity involved as a "natural" use of the land. 29 Although
"appropriate" may be a more accurate word than "natural" for distinguish-
ing the latter cases,3 0 courts consistently have limited application of the
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to activities that are unduly dangerous
in relation to the specific area in which the activities occur.',
American courts have refused to find that the manufacture or distribution
of handguns are activities that do not suit the locality in which they occur. 2
25. See Caporale v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79,-, 175 A.2d 561, 564
(1961) (pile driving is inherently dangerous activity permitting strict liability recovery against
defendants); Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540,-, 162 N.W.2d 243, 245-47 (1968) (pile driving
is ultrahazardous activity, and persons injured by activity can recover even though defendants
carefully conducted pile driving activity).
26. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328,-., 270 P. 952, 955 (1928)
(adjoining property owner entitled to recover damages for oil and mud thrown on premises in
eruption of oil well caused by oil drilling regardless of absence of negligence in conducting oil
drilling activity).
27. See Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App.2d 638,-., 295 P.2d 958, 962 (1956) (builder
held not liable for injuries to tenant of apartment building when plaster fell upon tenant due
to vibrations from construction because construction was not extrahazardous activity and builder
was not negligent).
28. See New Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Ferguson, 134 Colo. 502,-, 307 P.2d
479, 482 (1957) (company operating dam to divert irrigation water from river into ditch not
liable to owners of flooded property absent showing of proximate cause because dam was in
natural bed of river).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 526 (American courts refuse to apply Rylands v.
Fletcher principle to damages caused by natural use of land); see supra note 24 (decisions
refusing strict liability recovery under abnormally dangerous activity theory because activity not
unnatural in particular location in which it occurs).
30. See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 526. American courts refuse to apply the abnormally
dangerous activity doctrine to activities that courts label "natural" uses of the land. Id. An
activity is not "natural" for purposes of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine if the
activity is "out of place" and inappropriate in view of the activity's surroundings. Id.; see
Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51, 61 (Mo. App. 1932) (filling station owner and operator not
liable for leakage of gasoline from tanks into neighboring landowner's well, absent negligence,
because storage of gasoline is not "unnatural" use of land). Accordingly, although blasting
and storing hazardous liquids may qualify as abnormally dangerous activities if conducted in a
densely populated area, if a party conducted these activities in a desert, a court likely would
not label the activities abnormally dangerous. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 530.
31. See supra note 24 (abnormally dangerous activity doctrine limited to activities that
are inappropriate in light of location of activity).
32. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265 n.43, 1267 (5th Cir. 1985) (marketing
of handguns is not activity properly classified as abnormally dangerous because marketing of
handguns is not activity relating to land or other immovables); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc.,
304 Md. 124, 133-34, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985) (manufacture and distribution of handguns
is not abnormally dangerous activity because not dangerous in relation to place in which activity
occurs); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,___, 704 P.2d 118, 121 (1985) (refusing
19861 1319
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For example, one handgun victim recently claimed in an action against a
handgun manufacturer that the activity of producing and marketing hand-
guns satisfied the locality requirement of section 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts because no location existed in the United States in which
manufacturers safely can market handguns for sale to the general public.33
Although a trial court found that the locality question created a factual
issue,3 4 an appeals court rejected the argument and found that, as a matter
of law, the manufacture or distribution of handguns was not related to land
or other immovables . 3  The appellate court further explained that the man-
ufacture or sale of a consumer product is not a land related activity and that
manufacturers of consumer products, therefore, cannot be liable under an
abnormally dangerous activity theory.
6
Aside from the arguments that recovery under the abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine is limited to land related activities and that sections 519 and
strict liability recovery against handgun manufacturer under abnormally dangerous activity
doctrine because marketing of handguns does not carry risk of harm to persons or property in
vicinity).
33. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd
sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 520 (1976) (defining abnormally dangerous activity). In Richman v. Charter Arms
Corp., the family of a murder victim sued the manufacturer and distributor of the handgun
used in the homicide seeking strict liability recovery under an abnormally dangerous activity
theory. 571 F. Supp. at 202. Attempting to satisfy the locality consideration of § 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, counsel for the victim's family asserted that distributors safely
could not market handguns to the general public anywhere in the United States. Id. The district
court found that the plaintiff's locality argument created a question of material fact suitable
for the jury. Id. at 201-02.
The district court certified all questions of law to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1985). In reversing
Richman and granting summary judgment for the handgun manufacturer, the Fifth Circuit in
Perkins concluded that an abnormally dangerous activity must be an activity relating to land
or other immovables, that the activity conducted must be the direct cause of the injury, that
the defendant directly must have been engaged in the injury producing activity, and that the
activity must not require intervening substandard conduct of a third party to cause injury. 762
F.2d at 1267-68. The Fifth Circuit determined that courts would not characterize the marketing
of handguns as a land related activity and rejected the district court's finding that material
issues of fact existed concerning the applicability of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine.
Id. at 1269. Because the appellate court found that the marketing of handguns is not an activity
that is abnormally dangerous in itself, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provisions could not
provide relief to the plaintiff. Id. at 1265 n.43. In any event, the Perkins court found that
Louisiana state courts would not apply the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
concerning abnormally dangerous activities because Louisiana courts never have invoked the
Second Restatement provisions for determining the existence of an abnormally dangerous
activity. Id. at 1265.
34. Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983); see supra
note 33 (discussion of Richman).
35. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1267 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing trial court
and finding that marketing of handguns was not ultrahazardous activity because marketing of
handguns is not land related activity).
36. Id.; see supra note 33 (discussion of Perkins v. F.LE. Corp.).
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520 of Restatement (Second) of Torts are wholly inapplicable to a suit against
the manufacturer of a handgun used in crime, the assertion that the manu-
facture or distribution of handguns falls within any of the considerations
outlined in sections 519 and 520 misses a crucial distinction between the
manufacture or distribution of a product and the use of that product.
3 7
According to a comment to section 519 of the Second Restatement, liability
arises from the abnormal danger of the activity itself. 8 Courts have explained
that the manufacture and distribution of handguns is not an activity that is
dangerous in itself and that classifying the sale of a product as an activity
merely blurs the distinction between strict liability for unreasonably danger-
ous products and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity.
3 9
Courts commonly object to labeling the manufacture or distribution of
handguns as an abnormally dangerous activity because such a holding would
make all manufacturers and distributors insurers against harm caused by the
use of their products. 40 Courts maintain that imposing strict liability on
manufacturers of handguns subsequently used in crime could require that
manufacturers of knives, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and other potentially
37. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting manufacturer's liability and finding that complaint alleging that manufacture and sale
of handguns is abnormally dangerous activity confuses products liability with abnormally
dangerous activity theory); Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 501 (proponents of abnormally
dangerous activity theory of recovery against handgun manufacturers miss crucial distinction
between use of item and production and sales of item); Note, supra note 7, at 1923 (under
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, user of product, rather than product's manufacturer,
generally is party that is liable). In Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., the family of a
murder victim sued the manufacturer and distributor of the handgun used in the homicide. Id.
at 1204. The complaint alleged that the distribution of handguns constituted an abnormally
dangerous activity and that strict liability was appropriate. Id. The Martin court denied strict
liability recovery because the court found that the sale of a product was not an activity and
because the Martin court determined that courts properly would not impose strict liability for
the sale of a nondefective product by a nonnegligent manufacturer. Id.
38. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 519 comment d (1976).
39. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265 n.43 (5th Cir. 1985) (marketing of
handguns is not activity that is dangerous in and of itself, and when injury occurs, injury is
result of actions by third parties, not result of sale of handgun); Martin v. Harrington and
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (characterizing sale of handguns as
activity blurs distinction between abnormally dangerous activity and unreasonably dangerous
product theories of strict liability); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,-, 704 P.2d
118, 121 (1985) (design, manufacture, and sale of handguns in not dangerous in itself and
classifying activity as abnormally dangerous because of subsequent criminal use blurs distinction
between use and marketing of products).
40. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1269 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting liability
because finding that marketing of handguns is abnormally dangerous activity would make
manufacturer insurer against both legitimate and illegitimate uses of product); Martin v.
Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting liability because
only legislature properly can decide to make manufacturer insurer for nondefective products);
Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,- , 704 P.2d 118, 122 (1985) (to hold one who
designs, manufactures, and sells nondefective product strictly liable for misuse of product by
third party amounts to enterprise liability, a concept that Oregon Supreme Court previously
had rejected).
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dangerous products act as insurers against all harm produced by their
products. 4' Additionally, courts have recognized that the criminal use of a
handgun, not manufacture and distribution of handguns, has injured the
handgun victims in the litigation that has begun across the nation. 42 Although
a court could find that the criminal use of a handgun is dangerous and could
qualify as an abnormally dangerous activity in a suit against the user, a
court likely will not find that the production and distribution of handguns
is an unreasonably dangerous activity.43
Despite the limitation by courts of the abnormally dangerous activity
doctrine to activities that are inappropriate to the locality and dangerous in
and of themselves, some handgun victims have argued that a strict application
of section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the conclusion
that the manufacture and distribution of handguns is an abnormally danger-
ous activity. 4 Some complaints filed by handgun victims have focused on a
recommendation in section 520 that courts balance the utility of an activity
with the risk of harm to society created by the activity.45 The plaintiffs in
41. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1269 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that
Louisiana has policy against holding nonnegligent manufacturer liable for harm resulting from
misuse of nondefective product); Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200,
1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to make handgun manufacturer and distributor insurer against
criminal use of product and finding that Illinois limits imposition of strict liability for sale of
products to unreasonably dangerous products); Burkett v. Freedoms Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,
-, 704 P.2d 118, 122 (1985) (Oregon has rejected finding of liability upon manufacturers and
distributors when product is not defective and when injuries result only from misuse of product).
42. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1985) (victim suffered
injury through criminal use of handgun and not through marketing or production of handgun);
Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7t Cir. 1984) (same);
Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1207-08 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (same); Kelley v. R.G.
Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 133-34, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985) (same).
43. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984)
(if plaintiffs had brought action against assailant claiming that use of handgun was abnormally
dangerous activity, plaintiff properly would state cause of action); Burkett v. Freedom Arms,
Inc., 299 Or. 551,.__, 704 P.2d 118, 121 (1985) (although court properly may find that use
of handgun was abnormally dangerous activity, no common law jurisdiction would hold that
manufacturing and marketing of handgun was abnormally dangerous activity).
44. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff maintained that manufacture and distribution of handguns was abnormally dangerous
activity under §§ 519-20 of Restatement (Second) of Torts); Richman v. Charter Arms Corp.,
571 F. Supp. 192, 199 (E.D. La. 1983) (same), rev'd sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762
F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,.._.._, 704 P.2d 118,
120 (1985) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) (defining abnormally
dangerous activity).
45. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983) (plaintiff
argued that handguns have no utility and that plaintiff satisfied § 520 of Restatement (Second)
of Torts by demonstrating that danger inherent in handguns outweighs value), rev'd sub nom.
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299
Or. 551,-, 704 P.2d 118, 119 (1985) (plaintiffs alleged that manufacture and distribution of
handguns was activity whose risks outweighed value to community); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment k (1976) (in determining existence of abnormally dangerous
activity, courts should consider risks of activity compared to social utility).
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actions against manufacturers and distributors of handguns subsequently
used in crime argue that handguns have minimal social utility when compared
with the risks of harm.16 The proponents of strict liability against handgun
manufacturers and distributors under the abnormally dangerous activity
provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts often claim that the com-
munity in which the manufacturer or distributor initially sold the handgun
largely is not devoted to the dangerous enterprise of handgun manufacturing
and sale and that the community's prosperity would not falter due to the
discontinuance of the activity of handgun manufacturing and marketing.
47
Some plaintiffs have argued that, balanced against the minimal value of the
activity to the community, the deaths and injuries caused by handguns
require that the parties carrying on the activity of manufacturing and
marketing handguns pay for the damage that is a product of their activity. 4s
Regardless of the merit of these arguments, most of the causes of action
have failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the disutility of handgun production and distribution because
courts have found that state legislatures, by not banning handguns, have
recognized some legitimate uses for handguns. 49 Commentators have added
that the victims' claims that the manufacture and distribution of handguns
is of no utility to society overlook the economic benefits of the gun
manufacturing and distribution business in added jobs and taxable revenue. 0
Furthermore, the victims' assertions that handguns lack social utility may
46. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983) (plaintiff
argued that handguns have no societal value and that risks far outweigh utility of handguns),
rev'd sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Podgers, Tort
Lawyers Take Aim at Handguns, ThE BRIEF, Nov. 1981, at 4, 6 (plaintiffs in suits against
manufacturers and distributors of handguns subsequently used in crime claim that handguns
fail to meet any test of social value); Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 499 (proponents of
applicability of abnormally dangerous activity liability to handgun manufacturers rely primarily
upon extent to which danger of handguns outweighs value).
47. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 202 (E.D. La. 1983) (plaintiff
argued that community largely is not devoted to marketing of handguns and that handguns
have no utility), rev'd sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
48. See id. at 194 (plaintiff claimed that by marketing handguns defendant assumed
special responsibility to public and should bear costs of harm as cost of doing business); Burkett
v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551,._.__, 704 P.2d 118, 119 (1985) (plaintiff alleged that
manufacturer could not undertake activity of manufacturing and marketing handguns without
assuming consequences of activity).
49. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265-66 n.43 (5th Cir. 1985) (Louisiana
legislature, by not banning handgun sales, believes legitimate uses for handguns exist); Martin
v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding handgun
manufacturers strictly liable under abnormally dangerous activities doctrine would thwart
Illinois' policy supporting citizens' right to possess handguns by making possession of handgun
unreasonably dangerous).
50. See Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 499 (firearms industry employs thousands of
individuals and contributes millions of tax dollars to local, state, and federal governments). But
cf. Ram, Geldes & Bueno, Health Care Costs of Gunshot Wounds, 73 Osno ST. MED. A.J.
437, 438 (1977) (estimated that $500 million spent annually in treating gunshot injuries); Turley
& Harrison, Strict Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAmINE L. REV. 285, 287 (1983) (same).
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negate the victims' claims for recovery under an abnormally dangerous
activity theory because courts developed the doctrine to provide relief to
persons injured by a dangerous activity that was too beneficial to justify
discontinuing the activity." Arguing.that the production and distribution of
handguns lacks any societal value is contrary to the purpose of protecting
beneficial but dangerous activity underlying the abnormally dangerous activ-
ity doctrine and the adoption by many courts of sections 519 and 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.1
2
Apart from the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, some handgun
victims or their survivors have argued that manufacturers and distributors
of handguns subsequently used in crime are strictly liable for the damage
caused by the criminal use of their handguns because handguns are unrea-
sonably dangerous products.5 3 In support of the unreasonably dangerous
product claims, the plaintiffs in suits against handgun manufacturers and
distributors have cited section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which makes the seller of a product liable to an injured user or consumer of
an unreasonably dangerous product even though the seller has exercised all
possible care in selling the product.5 4 To state a claim properly under an
unreasonably dangerous product theory of strict liability, the complaint must
allege that the product sold by the defendant in the action was in a defective
condition when the seller released possession or control of the product, that
the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, that the
defect caused the alleged injuries, and that the product was expected to and
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment b (1976) (strict liability under
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine arises from unpreventable risk of harm in activity whose
social value does not justify its elimination); Note, Legal Limits, supra note 5, at 843 (by
bringing action against handgun manufacturer and distributor under abnormally dangerous
activity theory, victim of handgun crime seeks recovery under theory which by its nature negates
characterization of handguns as useless to society). ,
52. See supra note 51 (abnormally dangerous activity doctrine allows continuation of
dangerous activities that are valuable to society).
53. See, e.g., Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (mother
of murder victim claimed that manufacturer designed handgun defectively); Richman v. Charter
Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp.-192, 194 (E.D. La. 1983) (mother of murder victim sued murder
weapon's manufacturer alleging that handgun was unreasonably dangerous product), rev'd sub
nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Riordan v. International Armament
Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642,-, 477 N.E.2d 1243, 1297-98 (1985) (family of murder victim
claimed that manufacturer defectively designed handgun by making handgun small, inexpensive,
and readily concealable); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 134, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147
(1985) (victim of armed robbery and shooting sued manufacturer and distributor of handgun
claiming that manufacturer produced and sold unreasonably dangerous product).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) (defining unreasonably dangerous
products); e.g., Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (family of
handgun victim sued manufacturer of handgun claiming that manufacturer produced and
marketed unreasonably dangerous product under § 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts);
Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642,-, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297-
98 (1985) (same); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 134, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985)
(same).
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did reach the consumer without substantial change in its condition." In
determining whether a product is defective under section 402A, American
courts have applied a consumer expectation test.56 Under the consumer
expectation test, a seller of a product is not liable to a consumer unless the
product is in a condition not contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases the product with the ordinary knowledge a consumer in that
community would possess concerning the product's characteristics.
5
Contrary to many plaintiffs' arguments, American courts have found
that a handgun is not defective merely because it is capable of inflicting
harm during criminal use.5 8 A consumer would expect a handgun to be
55. See Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 135-36, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985)
(discussing requirements for action under unreasonably dangerous products theory).
56. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Industr., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 855 (5th Cir. 1967)
(applying consumer expectation test in suit against hair bleach manufacturer for injuries due to
chemical burn); DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So.2d 26, 30 (La. 1981)
(applying consumer expectation test in suit against blood bank for injuries due to contraction
of hepatitis); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976)
(adopting consumer expectation test in determining existence of defect in automobile); see also
W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, at 14 n.41 (1979) (approximately twenty-six
states follow consumer expectation test of § 402A in determining whether product is unreason-
ably dangerous); Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun,
24 Wu. & MARY L. REv. 467, 481 (1983) (over half of states use consumer expectation test to
determine existence of product defects); infra note 57 and accompanying text (defining consumer
expectation test).
57. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g, i (1964); see Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57,..._., 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)
(product is defective if product is in dangerous condition beyond contemplation of ultimate
consumer); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis.2d 326, 332,
230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975) (same); W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 698 (5th ed.
1984) (same).
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a lathe
for negligence and for breach of express and implied warranties when a piece of wood flew out
of the lathe and injured the plaintiff. 59 Cal.2d at._., 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
On appeal from a verdict against the manufacturer, the Supreme Court of California affirmed
the trial court decision and held that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort if its product causes
injury and if the manufacturer had reason to expect that the consumer would use the product
without inspecting the product for defects. 59 Cal.2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
700.
In Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., a child was injured
when he fell into a pool built by the defendant company. 69 Wis.2d at 332, 230 N.W.2d at
798. The parents of the child sued the pool company under an unreasonably dangerous product
theory, claiming that the absence of a self-latching gate on the fence surrounding the swimming
pool constituted a design defect. 69 Wis.2d at 332, 230 N.W.2d at 798. The Vincer court found
that the absence of a self-latching gate was obvious to any consumer and that, therefore, the
pool company did not design defectively the pool and fence. 69 Wis.2d at 232, 230 N.W.2d at
798.
58. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985) (handgun that fired
precisely as expected is not defective); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210-11
(N.D. Tex. 1985) (no defect in handgun used in crime because no malfunction occurred); Kelley
v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 136, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985) (possibility that criminal
could use handgun to inflict harm does not make handgun defective).
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dangerous because manufacturers design handguns to discharge bullets with
deadly force. 9 Several courts have recognized that the characterization of a
handgun as defective confuses a product's normal function that may be
dangerous with a defect that renders a product unexpectedly dangerous.60
For a court to find a handgun defective, some problem in the handgun's
design or manufacture must cause the handgun to fire unexpectedly or in an
unanticipated manner. 6' Absent any hidden danger that causes a handgun to
misfire or otherwise to malfunction, a court properly cannot label a handgun
an unreasonably dangerous product under the consumer expectation test
because a handgun does not contain dangers that a consumer would not
appreciate fully. 62
Some commentators have argued that the consumer expectation test does
not go far enough in promoting design safety and that courts should invoke
a risk/utility test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.
63
59. See Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (consumers
know that handgun is dangerous since, by its very nature, handguns fire bullets with force to
kill); Mavilia v. Stoeger Industr., 574 F. Supp. 107, 110-11 (E.D. La. 1983) (dangers of handgun
are obvious and widely known); Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 197 (E.D.
La. 1983) (every reasonable consumer knows that people can use handguns as murder weapons),
rev'd sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Kelley v. R.G. Industr.,
Inc., 304 Md. 124, 136, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985) (consumers expect handguns to be dangerous
and to have capacity to kill); see also Santarelli & Calio,'supra note 4, at 484 n.58, 484-87 (no
design defects exist in handguns simply because they are deadly).
60. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984)
(no strict liability results from handgun that poses dangers fully recognizable by average
consumer); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 136, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985)
(although normal function of handgun may be dangerous, handgun is not defective because
consumers expect that handgun is capable of inflicting harm).
61. See Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 135-36, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985)
(finding that handgun was not defective because handgun fired as expected). The Court of
Appeals in Kelley v. R.G. Indusir., Inc. explained by analogy that an automobile manufacturer
is not liable when a reckless driver runs down a pedestrian because a purchaser buys an
automobile with the expectation that the automobile has the ability to be propelled with great
force and at high speeds. Id. On the other hand, if an automobile contains an unexpected
defect, such as a gasoline tank placed in a position vulnerable to rear end collisions, a
manufacturer could be liable under the unreasonably dangerous product doctrine. Id.
62. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985) (no liability under
unreasonably dangerous products theory because handgun functioned precisely as anticipated
and because dangers of handguns are open and obvious); Rhodes v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 173
Ga. App. 51, 52, 325 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1984) (handgun performed as expected because bullet
fired when child pulled trigger); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 IlI. App.3d 642,
-, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (1985) (victim of criminal use of handgun denied recovery against
handgun manufacturer because plaintiff failed to show that handgun performed in manner not
expected in light of handgun's nature and function); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md.
124, 135-36, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1985) (victim shot by armed robber denied recovery under
unreasonably dangerous products theory because handgun performed in expected manner).
63. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 613-14 (1980) (consumer expectancy
test insufficiently creates incentives for safer product design); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect
in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 589 (1980)
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In light of the growing acceptance of some variation of a risk/utility test,64
American courts have examined the applicability of risk/utility analysis in
suits against manufacturers and distributors of handguns under an unreason-
ably dangerous product theory of strict liability.61 Courts examining the
applicability of a risk/utility test to determine the existence of defects in
handguns have recognized that the California Supreme Court, in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.,66 first adopted risk/utility analysis to determine the
existence of design defects in products. 67 In Barker, a machinery operator
injured himself when he attempted to escape from a malfunctioning loader.
68
A jury instruction in the trial court conditioned strict liability on a finding
by the jury that the machinery was unreasonably dangerous for the intended
purpose. 69 On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the manufacturer, the
California Supreme Court found that the limiting instruction was insufficient
and articulated a disjunctive two-prong test for design defects. 70 The Barker
court explained that the trial court should have instructed the jury that,
under a first prong, a product is defective in design, sufficient to impose
strict liability on its manufacturer, if the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or foresee-
(same); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Products
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 312 (1977) (same); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973) (consumer's expectation alone cannot
serve as test for design defects).
64. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-86 (Alaska 1979)
(adopting risk/utility test to determine existence of defect in product); Hunt v. City Stores,
Inc., 387 So.2d 585, 588 (La. 1980) (same); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152,
174-76, 386 A.2d 816, 827-28 (1978) (same).
65. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1272-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (examining
applicability of risk/utility test for identifying defects in handgun used to murder plaintiff's
decedent); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (risk/utility
test for design defects offered to prove that handgun used to injure plaintiff was unreasonably
dangerous product); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 135-38, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148-
50 (1985) (victim of criminal shooting argued that risk/utility test demonstrated design defect
in handgun).
66. 20 Cal.3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
67. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985) (examining applica-
bility of Barker type risk/utility test to determine existence of design defect in handguns);
Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (1985)
(plaintiffs in suit against handgun manufacturer attempted to demonstrate design defect in
handgun under Barker type risk/utility test); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 135-
37, 497 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (1985) (victim shot by armed robber argued that handgun was
defectively designed under Barker type risk/utility test); see also Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 573
P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 (adopting risk/utility analysis to determine existence
of design defects in products).
68. Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229. In Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., an operator of a loader injured himself when he leaped from the machinery which
bystanders told him was beginning to tip. Id. A piece of lumber fell on the operator as the
operator attempted to flee the area, causing serious injury to the operator. Id.
69. Id. at 422, 573 P.2d at 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
70. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40; see infra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Barker court's two-prong test for design defects).
1986] 1327
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
able manner. 7' Alternatively, under a second prong, a jury could find that a
product is defective if the product's design was the proximate cause of the
injuries sustained and if the defendant fails to prove that the benefits of the
product's design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. 72
Despite a growing acceptance of the risk/utility approach in identifying
design defects in products, most courts have determined that the facts
surrounding the suits brought by victims of handgun crime do not suggest
application of a Barker type risk/utility test for product design defects. 7"
According to courts and commentators, a risk/utility test is appropriate only
when a product malfunctions or otherwise causes unintended results, and
the handguns used against the victims of handgun crime generally do not
malfunction. 74 Although a court appropriately could apply a risk/utility test
71. Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. In essence,
the first prong of the Barker v. Lull Eng'g test, that a product is defective in design if the
product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
intended and foreseeable manner, is the consumer expectation test. See Bimbaum, supra note
63, at 604 (first prong of Barker test is derived from consumer expectation test of § 402A of
Restatement (Second) of Torts); see also supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussion
of consumer expectation test for design defects in handgun manufacturer litigation).
72. Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. To determine
whether a manufacturer defectively designed a product under a risk/utility test, the jury should
examine the seriousness of the harm threatened by the allegedly defective design, the likelihood
of harm, and the mechanical, financial, and marketplace feasibility of a safer alternative design.
See id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (outlining risk/utility test for design
defects). Under the second prong of the Barker test, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the design of the product proximately caused the injury incurred, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to show that the benefits of the product's design outweigh the
danger that the design creates. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
73. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (risk/utility test
for design defects was not applicable because plaintiffs did not allege that handgun had
"something wrong" with it); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (risk/utility test was not applicable because handgun did not malfunction or cause
unintended results); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 138, 497 A.2d 1143, 1149
(1985) (risk/utility test is inappropriate defect test for products that did not malfunction).
74. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (risk/utility test
for design defects was inapplicable because plaintiff failed to allege that handgun malfunctioned
or caused unintended results); Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443,
456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978) (risk/utility analysis appropriate to examine manufacturer
liability when product malfunctions); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 137-38, 497
A.2d 1143, 1149 (1985) (risk/utility test is not applicable in examining defects in handgun
because handgun did not malfunction); Podgers, supra note 47, at 39 (products liability law
focuses on whether product malfunctioned); Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 484-85 (defect
simply means product malfunctioned in manner causing injury); Note, supra note 7, at 1915-16
(risk/utility analysis only appropriate if product has malfunctioned). Some commentators argue
that the criminal use of a handgun is not a handgun's intended use and that, therefore, courts
should subject handguns to special scrutiny under a risk/utility test for design defects. See
Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 41,
60-61 (1982) (risk/utility test appropriate to determine existence of design defects in handguns
used in crime). At least one commentator, however, has argued that the applicability of the
risk/utility test should not depend upon the legality of the particular use of the product. See
Note, supra note 7, at 1917 (arguing that risk/utility test is inapplicable in suits against
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to a loader that turned over unexpectedly,75 a motor home that exploded,7 6
or a power press that injured an operator's hands,7 the risk/utility test is
not applicable to a claim against a manufacturer of a handgun that did not
malfunction.78 Accordingly, most courts have found that no design defect
existed in the handguns that would subject the manufacturer to strict liability
under traditional products liability law. 9
Even if courts invoke the risk/utility test described in Barker, the plaintiff
in an action against a handgun manufacturer under a defective design theory
likely will lose.80 Under the risk/utility test described in Barker, the plaintiff
must make a prima facie showing that the design of a product was the
proximate cause of his injury before a court will balance the risks and
utilities of the product. 8' The prima facie showing is a heavy burden when
manufacturers of handguns used in crime). Because consumers can use numerous products in
an illegal manner, one commentator suggests that the argument that risk/utility analysis should
apply to the criminal use of a product has no logical limit. See id. (suggesting that application
of risk/utility test to handguns logically would support application of risk/utility test to
automobiles used as getaway cars and ships used to smuggle drugs).
75. See Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 (risk/
utility anlaysis recommended to determine whether design defect existed in loader that overturned
and injured operator); see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussion of Barker).
76. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633,_..__., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (1978) (in
evaluating design of mobile home that exploded upon impact with fence post, jury could
consider mechanical feasibility and consumer effects of alternative design).
77. See Duke v. Gulf& W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 411-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (jury
could consider design alternatives in power press that caught and injured operator's hands).
78. See supra note 74 (risk/utility test for design defects is not applicable to products that
do not malfunction).
79. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing
trial court and rejecting claim that handgun criminally used to murder plaintiff's decedent was
defectively designed); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-14, 1216 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (granting handgun manufacturer's motion for summary judgment and finding no design
defect in handgun armed robber used to injure plaintiff); Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304
Md. 124, 138-39, 497 A.2d 1143, 1149-50 (1985) (refusing to recognize cause of action alleging
that handgun criminally used to injure plaintiff was defectively designed).
80. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing inability of plaintiffs in
actions against handgun manufacturers to demonstrate necessary causal link between handgun's
design and plaintiff's injury).
81. Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238; see Birnbaum,
supra note 63, at 605-06 (plaintiff first must make prima facie showing that product proximately
caused injury before defendant must prove that product's utility exceeds risks). A plaintiff
might establish that a product's design proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries by utilizing
statistics to show the foreseeability of injuries due to the criminal use of handguns, by arguing
that added safety features would have prevented the injuries, and by asserting that the
foreseeability together with the lack of safety features proximately caused the injuries. Note,
supra note 56, at 492. A court likely would find, however, that the criminal act of firing the
handgun intervened to destroy the causal link between the handgun's design and the injury. Id.
at 495. The risk/utility test for design defects reverses the order of proof in a design defect case
by requiring the plaintiff first to prove causation and then to prove the existence of a defect.
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985). Under traditional products liability
law, a plaintiff first would prove that a defect existed before a court would require proof of
proximate cause. Id.
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the handgun manufacturer has produced a flawless product and the distrib-
utor has marketed a product that performed as expected.82 The complaints
filed in actions against manufacturers of handguns subsequently used in
crime generally have asserted that the concealability of the handgun proxi-
mately caused the injuries to the plaintiff."3 The size of the handgun, however,
did not proximately cause the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.8 4 The person
who pulled the trigger and the bullet that struck the victim were the proximate
causes of the injuries to the plaintiffs. 5
Even if the plaintiff in an action against a manufacturer of a handgun
subsequently used in crime could demonstrate a link between the design of
the handgun and the injury to the victim, the doctrine of superseding cause
may preclude recovery. 6 A superseding cause is an act by a third person or
force that, because of its intervention, relieves an antecedent tortfeasor from
liability for negligently causing a dangerous condition that results in injury.
87
American courts have viewed intervening criminality as a superseding cause
that precludes products liability recovery.88 Although one court has held that
a dealer who sold a handgun to an escaped convict in violation of a federal
statute requiring purchaser identification may have foreseen the subsequent
82. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs face major
hurdle in demonstrating design of nonmalfunctioning handgun proximately caused injuries due
to intervening criminal acts).
83. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1272-74 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's
claim that concealability of handgun and marketing of handguns to general public proximately
caused injuries to murder victim); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 I11. App.3d 642,
, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (1985) (rejecting claim that size and concealability of handgun
proximately caused murder victim's death).
84. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (injuries to plaintiff
resulted from criminal conduct of third party, not from any design defect in handgun); Martin
v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Riordan v.
International Armament Corp., 132 11. App.3d 642,-, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (1985) (same).
85. See supra note 84 (courts have found that criminal acts of third parties were proximate
cause of injuries to victims of handgun crime, not concealability of handguns).
86. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 440 (1964) (superseding cause intervenes to
relieve negligent party from liability); Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 487-91 (criminal use
of handgun is superseding cause that precludes finding of liability in suits against handgun
manufacturers); Note, Common-Law Approach, supra note 5, at 796 (party maintaining action
against manufacturer of handgun used in crime must overcome obstacle of characterizing
criminal act as superseding cause); Note, supra note 56, at 493-94 (criminal use of handgun is
superseding cause precluding recovery to shooting victims); infra note 87 and accompanying
text (defining superseding cause).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1964).
88. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)
(criminal misuse of handgun is unforeseeable, intervening cause that breaks causal connection
between manufacturer's actions and victim's injury); Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co.,
353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (importer not liable for injuries resulting from criminal
use of handgun because criminal use was superseding cause); Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis.2d 227,
254, 278 N.W.2d 238, 250-51 (1979) (criminal misuse of handgun may qualify as superseding
cause relieving negligent seller of liability).
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murder of two persons by the convict with the handgun,8 9 the majority of
American courts have found that the criminal use of a handgun destroys the
necessary link between a handgun's design and the victim's injury.9 Counsel
for manufacturers and distributors of handguns used in crime appropriately
can resort to the argument that "guns don't kill people, people kill people,"
in light of the trend of American decisions regarding criminality as a
superseding cause precluding products liability recovery.9'
Should a plaintiff somehow demonstrate a causative link between a
handgun's design and the injury sustained through criminal use of the
weapon, and withstand arguments of superseding cause, a court would
balance the risks of harm to society caused by the handgun against the
societal value of the handgun.9 2 Relevant to the balancing process is the
gravity of the danger posed by the product's current design, the likelihood
of the occurrence of the hazard, the mechanical and financial feasibility of
a safer design, and the adverse consequences to the product and the consumer
that the alternative design would cause.9 3 The manufacturer or distributor
would have the burden of showing that the utility of the handgun outweighs
the risk of harm to society. 94 The manufacturer or distributor may have
difficulty in demonstrating that handguns are more useful than harmful
because of a continuing split of opinion concerning the societal value of
handguns." In light of state legislative action nationwide, however, manu-
89. See Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1977). In Franco v.
Bunyard, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that a factual issue existed concerning whether a
dealer was liable to the families of two murder victims and to one injured victim shot by an
escaped convict to whom the dealer had sold a handgun. Id. at 147, 547 S.W.2d at 93. Because
the Franco court found that the escaped convict may not have succeeded in purchasing the
handgun from the dealer had the dealer properly requested identification from the purchaser as
required under federal regulations, the court found that a jury question existed concerning the
dealer's liability. Id.; see 27 C.F.R. § 178.124(c) (1985) (requiring that licensed dealer obtain
certification from purchaser that federal law does not prohibit purchaser from buying firearm
before completing transaction).
90. See Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1983) (criminal misuse
of handgun is not foreseeable); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Hawaii 58,-, 647
P.2d 713, 721 (1982) (same); Robinson v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc., 372 So.2d 1074,
1076 (Miss. 1979) (same); supra note 88 (precedent establishes criminal use of handgun as
superseding cause precluding manufacturer liability).
91. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (courts view criminal acts as superseding
causes that break causal link between product's design and injury to plaintiff).
92. See Note, supra note 56, at 485-86 (jury balances risks and utilities of handgun once
plaintiff demonstrates causal link between handgun's design and injury to plaintiff).
93. Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
94. See Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (once plaintiff
has made prima fade showing of proximate cause, defendant has burden of proving that utilities
of product outweigh risk of harm); Birnbaum, supra note 63, at 605-06 (same).
95. Compare P. SHIELDS, supra note 2, at 49-59 (arguing that handgun's useful purposes
are minimal compared to societal cost of harm produced by handguns) and Brzeczek, Law
Enforcement Perspectives on Utility of Handguns, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 333, 334-40 (1983)
(handguns are not sufficiently useful for home protection to justify risks of harm to community)
with Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 479-81 (social utility of handguns for self protection
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facturers and distributors might meet the burden of proving that the utility
of handguns outweighs any risk to society.9 In enacting statutes to regulate
the possession and sale of firearms, state legislatures have excluded from the
statutes' operation uses of handguns for target shooting, hunting, business
protection, and law enforcement purposes. 97 Manufacturers and distributors
might argue successfully that enacted legislation that regulates the possession
and sale of firearms and excludes certain uses from the statute's operation
legitimizes the excluded uses. 98 The manufacturers and distributors may
argue, therefore, that the legislature has determined that for the excluded
uses, the utility of handguns outweigh the risk of harm to society. 99
Despite the refusal by American courts to hold handgun manufacturers
and distributors liable to victims of handgun crime under an abnormally
dangerous activity or unreasonably dangerous product theory, a new theory
of strict liability, based upon the classification of a handgun as a Saturday
Night Special, may gain popularity due to the Maryland Court of Appeals'
decision in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.10 The facts in Kelley typify the
circumstances surrounding handgun manufacturer litigation initiated across
and sport outweigh any risks to society posed by handguns). See generally Hardy, Legal
Restriction of Firearm Ownership as an Answer to Violent Crime: What was the Question? 6
HAMLINE L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1983) (as early as 1353, nations have addressed the issue of
handgun control in light of concealability of handguns by criminals).
96. See Mavilia v. Stoeger Industr., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983) (enactment
of comprehensive handgun licensing provisions by state is indication that majority of legislators
believe that handguns have legitimate uses that exceed any risk of harm to society); Rhodes v.
R.G. Industr., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51, 52, 325 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1984) (same); Note, supra note
7, at 1915 (despite movement to ban handguns, legislative agreement exists that handguns have
legitimate uses); see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-36G (1982) (regulations governing
wearing, carrying and transporting of handguns in Maryland excludes target shooting, hunting,
business and home protection uses from statute's operation); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 269,
§ 12 (West 1970) (Massachusetts provision that bans variety of weapons does not include
handguns).
97. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-35 (West 1975) (statute prohibiting carrying
or wearing of handguns includes exceptions for law enforcement personnel, target shooters, and
other persons with legitimate reason); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c) (1982) (regulation
governing wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns excludes target shooting, hunting,
business protection, and home protection uses from statute's operation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 159:6 (1977) (permit required to carry pistol, and town official can issue permit to persons
legitimately desiring to hunt, target shoot or collect pistols).
98. See Kelley v. R.G. Industr., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 141-44, 497 A.2d 1143, 1151-53 (1985)
(Maryland regulations governing wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns legitimizes
target shooting, hunting, law enforcement and protection uses for handgun by excluding those
uses from regulations); Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 479-81 (handguns useful for
recognized purposes of target shooting, hunting, collecting, and self-defense); Note, supra note
7, at 1915 (noting legislative agreement that legitimate uses for handguns exist).
99. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing recognition by state legisla-
tures of legitimate uses for handguns).
100. See 304 Md. 124, 144-59, 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-61 (1985) (recognizing new cause of
action by victims of handgun crime against Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distrib-
utors).
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the nation.' 0' An armed robber shot Olen J. Kelley in the chest during a
holdup of the grocery store in which Kelley was an employee. 02 A Rohm
Revolver Handgun Model RG-38S, designed and marketed by Rohm Gesells-
chaft, a West German corporation, and assembled and initially sold by R.G.
Industries, Inc., a Miami based subsidiary of Rohm Gesellschaft, discharged
the damaging bullet. 03 Kelley survived the gunshot wound and brought suit
in Maryland against the West German corporation and its American subsid-
iary.'0 4 Kelley alleged that the gun manufacturers were strictly liable for his
injuries and claimed that the manufacture and distribution of the handgun
constituted an abnormally dangerous activity. 0 Alternatively, Kelley asserted
that the handgun used against him was an unreasonably dangerous product. 06
Rohm Gesellschaft moved to dismiss Kelley's action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 0 7 Finding no controlling precedent
in Maryland on the strict liability issues of the case, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland certified several questions to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland. 08 Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that
101. See id. at 128-29, 497 A.2d at 1144-45 (victim shot during armed robbery sued
manufacturer and distributor of handgun used in crime against victim); see, e.g., Perkins v.
F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1985) (person shot in barroom sued manufacturer
and distributor of handgun used against him); Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743
F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1984) (family of murder victim and survivor of criminal shooting
sued manufacturer of handgun used by criminal); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206,
1208 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (family of store clerk killed in armed robbery sued manufacturer of
robber's handgun).
102. 304 Md. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144. Olen Kelley had worked as the produce manager
of a Safeway for eleven years before an armed robber shot Kelley. See Siegel, Liability of
Manufacturers for the Negligent Design and Distribution of Handguns, 6 HAMLINE L. REV.
321, 321 (1983) (discussion of facts surrounding Kelley case by plaintiff's attorney in case).
JDuring those eleven years, armed robbers held up Kelley in the grocery store five times, each
time the perpetrator utilizing a concealed handgun to commit the crime. Id.
103. 304 Md. at 128-29, 497 A.2d at 1144-45.
104. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. Kelley originally sued the West German manufacturer
and its American subsidiary in Maryland state court. Id. On motion to the state court, the
American subsidiary removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland under the district court's diversity jurisdiction. Id. Upon stipulation by the parties,
the American subsidiary later was dismissed from the action. Id.
105. Id.; see supra notes 16-52 and accompanying text (discussion of handgun manufac-
turers' liability under abnormally dangerous activity doctrine).
106. 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145; see supra notes 53-99 and accompanying text
(discussing manufacturer liability for criminal use of handguns under products liability theory).
107. 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145; see FED. R. Cry. P. 12(b)(6) (dismissal for failure
to state claim upon which relief can be granted).
108. 304 Md. at 128-31, 497 A.2d at 1144-46. The district court certified questions to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.
Id.; see MD. CTs. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to 12-609 (1984) (provisions permitting
certification of questions by federal courts to Court of Appeals of Maryland). The Court of
Appeals, however, rephrased the questions certified by the district court pursuant to a provision
in the certification order. 304 Md. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146. Although the certification order
did not restrict the Court of Appeals to the question as phrased by the district court, the Court
of Appeals may have ventured from the scope of the certification order. Dorr & Burch, Saturday
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the certification order from the district court presented the following three
questions: whether the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun generally is
liable to a victim of the criminal use of a handgun under any strict liability
theory, whether the manufacturer or marketer of a small, cheap handgun
that one could characterize as a Saturday Night Special is liable to persons
injured through the handgun's criminal misuse, and whether the handgun
that fired the bullet injuring Olen Kelley was a Saturday Night Special." °
The Kelley court found that a plaintiff could not maintain an action in
Maryland against a manufacturer or distributor of a handgun subsequently
used in crime under an abnormally dangerous activity, unreasonably danger-
ous product, or other accepted theory of recovery." 0 The Court of Appeals
of Maryland in Kelley explained, however, that even though Maryland courts
would not hold handgun manufacturers liable for gunshot injuries resulting
from the criminal use of their products under traditional strict liability
theories, the common law is dynamic and can change to permit new actions
when courts conclude that circumstances justify the actions."' Maryland
courts will change the common law, however, only when the changes are
consistent with public policy." ' 2 Because the Maryland legislature had enacted
a comprehensive regulatory scheme concerning the carrying and transporting
of handguns, and had excluded from the statute's operation the use of
handguns by target shooters, hunters, business owners, and persons deemed
Night Fever, 15 THE BRIEF, Winter 1986, at 10, 13-14. The questions certified by the district
court related only to the permissibility of a cause of action in Maryland under either an
abnormally dangerous activity or an unreasonably dangerous product theory. 304 Md. at 129-
31, 497 A.2d at 1145-46. The Court of Appeals rephrased the certified questions raising the
questions concerning Saturday Night Specials sua sponte. 304 Md. at 131, 497 A.2d at 114; see
Dorch & Burr, supra, at 14 (arguing that Kelley court answered questions beyond issues certified
to court). The rephrasing of the questions to include the issue of strict liability against Saturday
Night Special manufacturers and distributors occurred after oral argument in the Court of
Appeals. Dorch & Burr, supra, at 14. The court heard no oral argument on the issue, received
no briefs on the subject of Saturday Night Specials, and did not disclose that the court was
considering a cause of action based upon the categorizing of a handgun as a Saturday Night
Special until the court rendered the Kelley decision. Id.
109. 304 Md. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146; see id. at 132-38, 497 A.2d at 1146-50 (discussing
certified questions); infra notes 110-205 and accompanying text (Kelley court recognized cause
of action in strict liability against Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors and
suggested considerations for classifying handguns as Saturday Night Specials).
110. See 304 Md. at 133-34, 497 A.2d at 1147 (denying strict liability recovery under
abnormally dangerous activity theory because court found that manufacture and distribution of
handguns was not land-related activity); id. at at 134-38, 497 A.2d at 1147-50 (denying strict
liability recovery under unreasonably dangerous product theory because court found no defect
in handgun that criminal used to shoot plaintiff); see also supra notes 16-52 and accompanying
text (discussing inapplicability of abnormally dangerous activity doctrine in suits against
manufacturers and distributors of handguns subsequently used in crime); supra notes 53-99 and
accompanying text (unreasonably dangerous product theory provides no relief to victim of
handgun crime).
111. See 304 Md. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1150-51 (courts must adjust common law to reach
fair and just solutions to pressing societal problems).
112. Id. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151.
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to have a substantial need to carry a handgun,"' the Kelley court determined
that not all handgun usage is contrary to Maryland's public policy against
transporting and carrying handguns." 4 In accordance with this finding, the
Kelley court found that the imposition of general strict liability upon
manufacturers of handguns for injuries sustained by victims of crime is not
consistent with Maryland public policy.' 
5
Although public policy generally does not support traditional strict
liability against handgun manufacturers, the Maryland high court in Kelley
found that a special category of handguns was beyond the protection of
Maryland public policy." 6 In the view of the Kelley court, Maryland's public
policy permitting the carrying and transporting of firearms that are useful
for sporting, law enforcement, and protection purposes does not sanction
the type of handgun commonly known as a Saturday Night Special, char-
acterized by short barrels, light weight, concealability, low cost, cheap metal,
poor manufacture, inaccuracy, and unreliability.17 The court in Kelley found
that Saturday Night Specials are unfit for any use legitimized by the statutory
exceptions to Maryland's legislation regulating the carrying and transporting
of handguns." 8 According to the Kelley court, Saturday Night Specials have
113. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-36G (1982) (excluding hunting, target practice,
home and business protection uses of handguns from statute regulating wearing, carrying, and
transporting of handguns in Maryland). The Maryland General Assembly enacted a statute
regulating the carrying, wearing, and transporting of handguns because of an alarming increase
in the number of violent crimes perpetrated in Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(a)(i)
(1982). The Maryland General Assembly found that a large percentage of the violent crimes in
Maryland involved the use of handguns and that regulations for the wearing, carrying, and
transporting of handguns were necessary to preserve the peace and to protect the rights and
liberties of Maryland's citizens. Id. at § 36B(a)(i), (iv).
114. 304 Md. at 141-44, 497 A.2d at 1151-53.
115. See id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1153 (rejecting recovery against handgun manufacturers
for misuse of product under traditional strict liability theories because of state legislature's
recognition of legitimate uses for handguns).
116. See id. (Maryland public policy permitting some limited carrying, wearing, and
transporting of handguns does not protect Saturday Night Specials because people do not use
Saturday Night Specials for legitimate purposes).
117. Id. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54. Saturday Night Special is the term given to
inexpensive handguns that predominate in crime in poor neighborhoods. Cook, The "Saturday
Night Special": An Assessment of Alternative Definitions from a Policy Perspective, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735, 1736 (1981). Saturday Night Specials generally are handguns
made of cheap metals and typically are small, low calibre pistols. Id. See generally Bruce-Briggs,
The Great American Gun War, 45 PuB. INTEREST 37, 50 (1976) (discussing origin of term
Saturday Night Special).
118. 304 Md. at 153-55, 497 A.2d at 1157-58; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(c) (1982)
(excluding hunting, target shooting, business and home protection uses of handguns from statute
regulating carrying, wearing, and transporting handguns in Maryland); see also Proposed
Amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 to Prohibit the Sale of "Saturday Night Special"
Handguns: Hearings on S. 2507 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1971) (testimony of Maxwell
Rich, Executive Vice President of National Rifle Association) (Saturday Night Specials have no
sporting purpose because these handguns frequently are poorly made) [hereinafter cited as
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presented special problems for law enforcement officials and are virtually
useless for the legitimate purposes of law enforcement, hunting, target
practice, or the protection of homes or businesses. ",9 Moreover, the Maryland
court stated that Saturday Night Specials are most valuable to criminals,
primarily because of the low cost and concealability of the weapon. 20 Because
Maryland had a statute making it a separate crime to use a handgun in the
perpetration of crime,' 2' the Kelley court concluded that Saturday Night
Specials have no legitimate purpose and that, therefore, public policy con-
siderations present no bar to the imposition of strict liability against manu-
facturers and distributors of Saturday Night Specials. 2
The Kelley court determined that congressional action was in accord
with the court's finding that Maryland's public policy permitting the carrying,
wearing, and transporting of firearms for legitimate uses does not cover
Saturday Night Specials. 23 The Kelley court determined that congressional
action in the Gun Control Act of 1968,'1 together with the continuing
Saturday Night Special Hearings]; id. at 109-10 (testimony of Geoffrey Alprin, General Counsel
of Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.) (Saturday Night Specials often misfire,
fire accidentally, backfire and are inaccurate at short distances).
119. 304 Md. at 144-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54; see H.R. REP. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4410, 4415 (Congress designed import
restrictions in Gun Control Act of 1968 to stop importation of small, cheap weapons that pose
major law enforcement problems). Saturday Night Specials pose difficult law enforcement
problems because the handguns generally are manufactured from soft, inexpensive metal.
Saturday Night Special Hearings, supra note 118, at 109-10 (statement of Geoffrey Alprin,
General Counsel of Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.). Because manufactur-
ers often make Saturday Night Specials from soft metal, criminals easily can scratch off serial
numbers making the tracing of these weapons impossible. Id. Also, the firing of a Saturday
Night Special alters the soft metal of the handgun's bore, making ballistics examinations much
more difficult. Id.
120. 304 Md. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158; see Cook, supra note 117, at 1740-42 (price and
size are two most important characteristics of handgun to criminals).
121. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1982).
122. 304 Md. at 154-55, 497 A.2d at 1158.
123. Id. at 147-53, 497 A.2d at 1154-57; see infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text
(discussing federal policy against importation of Saturday Night Specials).
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1982). The Gun Control Act of 1968 and regulations issued by
the federal government concerning firearms importation currently disallows the importation of
handguns that are not "readily adaptable to sporting purposes." 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (1982).
Although the language in the Gun Control Act of 1968 specifically does not refer to Saturday
Night Specials, the effect of the statute is that distributors may not import Saturday Night
Specials manufactured outside the United States because the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms has found that Saturday Night Specials have no sporting purpose. Id.; see H.R. REP.
No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (main purpose of import restrictions in Gun Control Act of
1968 is to stop importation of cheap, small weapons that cause major law enforcement
problems), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4410, 4415. The federal statute,
however, does not prohibit the importation of parts for Saturday Night Specials that American
companies easily can assemble and sell in American markets. Saturday Night Special Hearings,
supra note 118, at 132 (testimony of Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); see
Note, Common-Law Approach, supra note 5, at 791 (loophole in Gun Control Act of 1968
permits importation of Saturday Night Special parts).
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regulation of handguns by the Department of Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, 2 5 has identified a distinct category of handguns that,
because of their characteristics, courts may treat differently. 26 The Kelley
court found that Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968 to ban
importation of Saturday Night Specials because Congress found that these
firearms lack legitimate value for any recognized use because of the poor
quality of the handguns. 27 Accordingly, the Kelley court determined that
Saturday Night Specials were beyond the protection of any federal public
policy allowing the importation and purchase of firearms for legitimate
uses.'
28
The Court of Appeals in Kelley maintained that manufacturers and
distributors of Saturday Night Specials ought to know that their products
have little or no legitimate purpose and that people will use the product
primarily in criminal activity. 12 9 Although recognizing that no other jurisdic-
tion had distinguished Saturday Night Specials from other handguns when
considering a shooting victim's strict liability claims against a handgun
manufacturer, the Kelley court determined that Maryland courts could find
a manufacturer or distributor strictly liable to a victim of a Saturday Night
Special because Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors ought
to know that people use their products principally in the perpetration of
crime'c ° The court, in fact, asserted that officials at R.G. Industries had
recognized the market for the particular type of handguns they produced.'
3 '
125. 27 C.F.R. § 178 (1985).
126. 304 Md. at 147-48, 497 A.2d at 1154-55.
127. Id. at 152, 497 A.2d at 1157; see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (Saturday
Night Specials were target of Gun Control Act of 1968 because Saturday Night Specials are
unsafe and lack legitimate uses), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2164-
67; H.R. REP. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (main purpose of import restrictions in Gun
Control Act of 1968 is to stop importation of cheap, small weapons that cause major law
enforcement problems), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4410, 4415.
128. 304 Md. at 154-55, 497 A.2d at 1158.
129. Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158-59; see also infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text
(discussing Kelley court's finding that Saturday Night Special manufacturers ought to know
that people use their products principally in criminal activity); infra notes 164-205 and accom-
panying text (questioning Kelley court's findings that Saturday Night Special manufacturers and
marketers ought to know that people use their products principally in criminal activity).
130. 304 Md. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159. Although no other court had distinguished Saturday
Night Specials from other handguns when the Kelley court was considering the certification
order, courts have hinted that a court might make a distinction between Saturday Night Specials
and other handguns. See Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
(court recognized handgun used to injure plaintiff as Saturday Night Special but found that
plaintiff's arguments applied equally to other handguns and, therefore, denied recovery); Mavilia
v. Stoeger Industr., 574 F. Supp. 107, 110 n.2 (D. Mass. 1983) (although denying strict liability
recovery to family of innocent bystander killed by gunshot, court suggested that Saturday Night
Specials have features that may bring product within doctrine of strict liability or breach of
warranty).
131. 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158; see Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal) in Guns,
HARPER'S, Sept. 1977, at 40 (discussing comments of R.G. Industries official made after author
deceived official by claiming to be dealer in handguns); infra notes 164-73 and accompanying
text (discussing alleged statements of R.G. Industries official).
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Citing a Michigan case that recognized a cause of action against a slingshot
manufacturer because the court believed that the manufacturer had marketed
the slingshots to children and possibly could foresee injuries resulting from
misuse, 3 2 the Kelley court concluded that Saturday Night Special manufac-
turers can foresee that purchasers will use the handguns in the perpetration
of crime.'33 Apparently to emphasize the foreseeability of the criminal use
of Saturday Night Specials, the Maryland court added that, as between a
shooting victim and a Saturday Night Special manufacturer, a manufacturer
is more culpable for a gunshot wound resulting from criminal activity.3 4
Accordingly, the Kelley court reasoned that the circumstances surrounding
the criminal use of small, inexpensive, and poorly crafted handguns war-
ranted the imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers and distributors
of Saturday Night Specials.
35
Upon finding that Maryland courts properly could impose strict liability
upon a manufacturer or distributor of a Saturday Night Special, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in Kelley attempted to explain the criteria for
determining whether a handgun was a Saturday Night Special. 36 Initially,
the Kelley court noted that no precise definition of a Saturday Night Special
existed. 37 The Court of Appeals, however, listed several considerations that
are relevant in classifying handguns as Saturday Night Specials. According
to the Maryland court, relevant considerations in determining whether a
handgun is a Saturday Night Special include the barrel length of the handgun,
concealability, cost, quality of materials and manufacture, accuracy, and
reliability. 3 Also, in the view of the Maryland Court of Appeals, courts
should consider whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms has
banned the importation of the particular model of handgun as well as the
industry standards and the perception of the particular handgun by law
enforcement officials, legislators, and the public. 
39
132. 304 Md. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1158; see Moning v. Alfano, 400 Mich. 425, 446-49, 254
N.W.2d 759, 769-70 (1977) (finding that jury question existed concerning toy slingshot manu-
facturer's liability to child injured through another child's misuse of slingshot); infra notes 177-
85 and accompanying text (discussing Moning).
133. 304 Md. at 155-56, 497 A.2d at 1159.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Kelley court found that the increasing number of deaths and injuries due to
handguns warranted the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers and distributors of
Saturday Night Specials because manufacturers make these products for criminal activity. Id.
136. Id. at 157-59, 497 A.2d at 1159-60; see infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text
(Kelly court's suggested considerations in determining whether handgun is Saturday Night
Special).
137. 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1159; see Hardy, supra note 95, at 401 (term "Saturday
Night Special" is incapable of definition); see also Cook, supra note 117, at 1736-42 (attempting
to define Saturday Night Specials and recognizing that most definitions are inadequate).
138. 304 Md. at 155-56, 497 A.2d at 1159-60; see Cook, supra note 117, at 1736
(congressional bills proposing ban of Saturday Night Specials have suggested that law base
definition of Saturday Night Specials on price, size, calibre, quality, reliability and lack of
sporting purpose).
139. 304 Md. at 155-56, 497 A.2d at 1159-60. The Department of Treasury, Bureau of
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The Kelley court emphasized that classifying a handgun as a Saturday
Night Special is a factual question for the jury and that courts rarely should
label a handgun a Saturday Night Special as a matter of law.' 40 The court
explained that before sending the question of a handgun's classification to
the jury, the plaintiff in an action against a handgun manufacturer or
distributor first must make a prima facie showing to the court that the
handgun that fired the injuring bullet possessed qualities characteristic of a
Saturday Night Special.' 4' For this purpose, the Kelley court explained that
the size and barrel length of the firearm alone are not sufficient. 42 Should
a plaintiff meet the preliminary showing that the handgun contains qualities
characteristic of a Saturday Night Special, a jury must decide whether the
handgun in question is a Saturday Night Special. 43 If a jury categorizes a
particular handgun as a Saturday Night Special, the jury may impose liability
upon a manufacturer for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, so long as the
shooting was a criminal act in which the plaintiff did not participate.' 44The
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, has the power under the Gun Control Act of 1968 to ban the
importation of particular handguns and to publish a list of handguns that does not meet the
Bureau's guidelines set out in "Factoring Criteria for Weapons," BATF Form 4590. See 18
U.S.C. § 925(d) (1982) (providing that Commissioner of Department of Treasury has power to
issue regulations concerning sale of firearms); 27 C.F.R. § 178 (1985) (regulations of Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms concerning sale of firearms and ammunition); BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMs, DEP'T OF TREASURY, PARTIAL LIST OF FOREIGN PRODUCTS
NOT AUTHORIZED FOR IMPORTATION INTO THE UNITED STATES (1985) (listing of handguns that
distributors may not import).
140. 304 Md. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1160. The Kelley court suggested several considerations
that the trier of fact should address in the analysis of whether the handgun that fired the bullet
that injured Olen Kelley was a Saturday Night Special. Id. at 159-61, 497 A.2d at 1160-61. For
instance, the trier of fact should consider the reputation of R.G. Industries as the foremost
manufacturer of Saturday Night Specials in America, the fact that the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms has listed the company as marketing products that do not meet acceptable
standards for handgun importation, and the statements of witnesses before congressional
committees that have characterized Rohm handguns as "junk" and as weapons without any
sporting purpose. Id. at 157-60, 497 A.2d at 1159-61. Other considerations include the short
length of the barrel, the selling price of $35 to $55, the similarity of the weapon to handguns
previously banned for importation, and studies on handguns used in crime that identify Rohm
handguns as among the poorest quality handguns made. Id.; see Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608
F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (noting that Rohm .38 calibre handgun criminally used
to injure plaintiff was Saturday Night Special).
141. 304 Md. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160.
142. Id. The Kelley court noted that size and barrel length are not sufficient to establish a
preliminary showing that a handgun possesses qualities characteristic of Saturday Night Specials
because non-uniformed law enforcement officials and other persons with legitimate reasons
sufficient to warrant a permit may carry small, short barrelled handguns. Id. According to the
Kelley court, small, short barrelled handguns used for legitimate uses by authorized personnel
are not Saturday Night Specials, and a court properly should not allow a jury to consider
whether these handguns are Saturday Night Specials. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. As the Kelley court explained, potential claimants might include intended victims
of crime, innocent bystanders unintentionally shot by criminals, and law enforcement officials
or others who intervene to aid a victim or to apprehend the criminal. Id. at 159 n.20, 497 A.2d
at 1160 n.20.
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Kelley court further held that handgun manufacturers could not fend off
liability by asserting a defense of contributory negligence or assumption of
the risk and that a jury could award any damages consistent with established
tort law against a manufacturer, distributor, or other party in the marketing
chain, including the retailer.'45
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Kelley, in answering the questions
certified by the federal district court, established a new action in strict
liability that Maryland victims of handgun crime can use against Saturday
Night Special manufacturers.'" Although the Kelley court did not classify
the action as a particular type of strict liability theory, the new cause of
action recognized by the Kelley court arguably is a cause of action arising
under an unreasonably dangerous product theory, asserting a design defect
in the product.'4 7 The design defect of a Saturday Night Special, in light of
the Kelley court's reasoning in establishing the cause of action against
Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors, is that the design
permits and encourages the criminal use of the product. 4 Arguably, a
plaintiff establishes that a defective design exists by demonstrating to the
court that the handgun manufacturer and distributor ought to know that
purchasers of their products would use the handguns primarily in the
perpetration of crime. 49 Under the scheme set out in Kelley, all manufacturers
and distributors of Saturday Night Specials ought to know that purchasers
use their products principally in the perpetration of crime and, therefore,
handgun victims or their families will win in a strict liability action upon
establishing that the handgun used to injure the victim was a Saturday Night
Special.1
50
Although several commentators support the imposition of strict liability
upon manufacturers and distributors of handguns used in crime, few com-
mentators expressly have recommended basing liability on categorizing hand-
guns as Saturday Night Specials. 5' Commentators have questioned the
145. Id. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160.
146. See id. at 144-62, 497 A.2d at 1152-62 (establishing strict liability cause of action
against manufacturers and distributors of Saturday Night Specials).
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (describing new cause of action in
Maryland against manufacturers and distributors of Saturday Night Specials).
148. See id. at 154-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59 (finding that chief value of Saturday Night
Special is for criminal activity and that Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors
know or ought to know that people use their products principally in perpetration of crime).
149. See id. (finding that courts could hold Saturday Night Special manufacturers and
distributors liable to victims of handgun crime because Saturday Night Special manufacturers
and distributors know or ought to know that people will use their products principally for
criminal activity).
150. See id. (Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors are liable to innocent
persons who suffer gunshot injuries from criminal use of their products because manufacturers
and distributors know or ought to know that their products have no legitimate uses and that
people most likely will use their products in criminal activity).
151. See Turley & Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6 HAMLINE L.
REv. 285, 308 (1983) (arguing that courts should hold handgun manufacturers and distributors
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workability of the proposed definitions of Saturday Night Specials and have
asserted that most of the definitions lack predictability, or are either over-
reaching or under-reaching in defining a distinct class of substandard hand-
guns.'12 Some even have questioned whether a distinct category of inexpen-
sive, poorly crafted handguns actually exists. ' The Kelley court recognized
the problems inherent in a definition of a Saturday Night Special, yet the
Maryland court was unwilling to permit manufacturers to flood American
markets with handguns that have no legitimate uses, without the manufac-
turers paying for what the court found were foreseeable societal costs.'
54
Accordingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals left to the jury the final
determination of the categorization of a handgun as a Saturday Night Special,
after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing to the court that the handgun
possesses qualities characteristic of Saturday Night Specials. 5 If the short
barrel and small size of the handgun do not suffice to meet the threshold
showing, as the opinion in Kelley instructs, the handgun's qualities that will
suffice to establish a prima facie case that the handgun is a Saturday Night
Special are not clear. 5 6 At least one commentator has suggested that con-
liable to victims of handgun crime under unreasonably dangerous products theory); Note, A
Shot at Stricter Controls: Strict Liability for Gun Manufacturers, 15 PAC. L.J. 171, 185-87
(1983) (same); cf. Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (although
denying recovery to victim shot by criminal using Saturday Night Special, court suggested that
arguments tailored only to Saturday Night Specials as distinct class of handguns might succeed);
Mavilia v. Stoeger Industr., 574 F. Supp. 107, 110 n.2 (D. Mass. 1983) (although denying strict
liability recovery to family of innocent bystander killed by gunshot, court suggested that
Saturday Night Specials have features that may bring product within doctrine of strict liability
or breach of warranty); Note, Common-Law Approach, supra note 5, at 799 (courts could find
that Saturday Night Specials, as distinct class of handguns, contain design defects permitting
strict liability recovery against manufacturers and distributors).
152. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1736-39 (arguing that traditional definitions of Saturday
Night Specials are not workable because definitions fail to focus on characteristics most
important to criminals); Hardy, supra note 95, at 401-02 (term "Saturday Night Special" is
incapable of definition, and distributors easily could circumvent proposed definitions based on
metal quality and price of handgun).
153. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1736 (defining Saturday Night Specials based upon
whether handgun has legitimate purpose or is safe may yield empty category); Hardy, supra
note 95, at 402 (distributors of handguns easily could circumvent label of Saturday Night Special
under any of proposed definitions by raising their product's price or by using a higher grade
of metal).
154. See 304 Md. at 157-61, 497 A.2d at 1159-61 (Saturday Night Special manufacturers
and distributors may be strictly liable to persons injured by the handguns because the handguns
lack any legitimate function).
155. Id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1160. Arguably, a jury properly should not determine whether
a handgun is a Saturday Night Special because allowing a jury to classify a handgun on an ad
hoc basis does not allow manufacturers or distributors to anticipate the classification of their
products. Dorr & Burch, supra note 108, at 14. If a legislature enacted the procedure allowing
juries to classify handguns as Saturday Night Specials, the legislation might violate due process
and equal protection by failing clearly to proscribe conduct sufficient to allow a person to
regulate his conduct. See id. (arguing that Kelley court performed legislative functions yet acted
inappropriately for legislative body by not providing safeguards for persons affected by action).
156. See 304 Md. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160 (court should not allow jury to consider whether
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cealability is one of two characteristics that most ably identify a Saturday
Night Special because criminals desire concealability to gain the element of
surprise and also to protect the handgun from police confiscation.'5 7 The
other characteristic important to criminals, the low price of a handgun, is
important in defining a Saturday Night Special because persons who could
not afford a handgun otherwise commit a highly disproportionate share of
crime.' 8
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelly found that certain handguns
virtually are useless for legitimate purposes.5 9 The Kelley court arguably
erred, however, in finding that Maryland's public policy of permitting the
carrying, wearing, and transporting of firearms for legitimate uses did not
include Saturday Night Specials. 60 The Maryland General Assembly at least
twice has rejected proposals to distinguish Saturday Night Specials from
other handguns and ban their use.' 6' By specifically refusing to ban Saturday
Night Specials, arguably, the Maryland General Assembly recognized that
Saturday Night Specials have at least some legitimate uses.' 62 Any finding by
a Maryland court to the contrary may constitute a usurpation of legislative
functions. 
63
Although the Kelley court's finding that manufacturers and distributors
of Saturday Night Specials ought to know that purchasers will use the
firearms in the perpetration of crime has some merit, the authority cited by
the Maryland court was weak. 64 First, in support of the finding that Saturday
handgun was Saturday Night Special unless plaintiff makes prima facie showing that handgun
has characteristics of Saturday Night Special beyond handgun's small size and short barrel); see
also infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (concealability of handgun is one of two
characteristics that most ably may identify Saturday Night Specials).
157. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1740-42 (because concealability and availability are
characteristics of handguns most important to criminals, court should base definition of Saturday
Night Special on size and price); Note, Common-Law Approach, supra note 5 at 791 (Saturday
Night Specials are attractive to criminals because of concealability and low price).
158. Cook, supra note 117, at 1740-41.
159. See 304 Md. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158 (finding that Saturday Night Specials are unfit
for legitimate uses); supra note 119 (Saturday Night Specials lack legitimate uses because these
products are too unreliable and inaccurate).
160. See Dorr & Burch, supra note 108, at 12 (arguing that legislative action in Maryland
indicates that Saturday Night Specials do not comprise distinct category of handguns that courts
can treat differently).
i61. See Md. H. 891, 1982 Sess. (proposing ban of Saturday Night Specials); Md. H. 122,
1976 Sess. (same); see also Dorr & Burch, supra note 108, at 12 (arguing that Maryland General
Assembly's refusal to pass proposed bans on Saturday Night Specials indicates that Maryland
legislators do not believe Saturday Night Specials comprise distinct category of handguns that
courts can treat differently).
162. See supra note 161 (Maryland General Assembly has rejected proposed ban on
Saturday Night Specials).
163. Dorr & Burch, supra note 108, at 14-15 (Kelly court overstepped bounds of judicial
function and wrongly performed legislative function of policymaking in controversial social
issue).
164. See infra notes 165-85 and accompanying text (arguing that authority cited by Kelley
court in finding that Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors ought to know that
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Night Special manufacturers and distributors ought to know that purchasers
will use their products primarily in criminal activity, the Kelley court relied
on a magazine article that contained alleged statements of an R.G. Industries
official. 6 Allegedly, the R.G. Industries official admitted that the company's
products sell well in ghetto areas, presumably high crime neighborhoods.66
The statements of the R.G. Industries officials, even if true, only support a
finding that R.G. Industries may have known that purchasers use R.G.
Industries products principally in criminal activity or that persons living in
ghetto neighborhoods often buy R.G. Industries products for protection .
67
The statements do not support a finding that all manufacturers and distrib-
utors of handguns that juries reasonably could label Saturday Night Specials
ought to know that purchasers use their handguns primarily in criminal
activity. 68 Moreover, the same article also included additional information
about R.G. Industries products that does not support the Kelley court's
conclusion. 69 The same R.G. Industries official that the Kelley court quoted
estimated that R.G. Industries sold 350,000 handguns in 1975.170 According
to the article, criminals used R.G. Industries handguns in approximately
30,000 murders, robberies, and assaults in 1975.'1' Using the data provided
by the article, purchasers used only eight and one-half percent of all R.G.
Industries handguns sold in 1975 in the perpetration of crime.17 2 The article
relied on by the Kelley court, therefore, is not strong support for the
conclusion that R.G. Industries or any other manufacturer and distributor
ought to know that purchasers use their handguns principally in the perpe-
tration of crime.
7 3
In further support of the finding that Saturday Night Special manufac-
turers and distributors ought to know that purchasers use their products
people use their products primarily for criminal activity was weak); see also Dorr & Burch,
supra note 108, at 14 (Kelly court relied primarily on anecdotal materials and hearsay sources
to support imposition of strict liability on Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distribu-
tors).
165. See 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158 (citing Harper's Magazine article as support
for finding that R.G. Industries officials know that handguns they produce are cheap and sell
well in high crime areas); Brill, supra note 131, at 40 (alleged statements of R.G. Industries
official indicates knowledge of manufacturers that company's handguns are poorly made and
attractive in ghetto neighborhoods).
166. Brill, supra note 131, at 40.
167. See id. (alleged statements of R.G. Industries officials refer only to handguns of R.G.
Industries).
168. Id.
169. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (magazine article cited by Kelley court
supports view that people do not use R.G. Industries handguns principally in criminal activity).
170. See Brill, supra note 131, at 41 (R.G. Industries official admitted that company sold
350,000 handguns in American markets in 1975).
171. Id. at 42.
172. See id. at 41-42 (citing sales and criminal use statistics for R.G. Industries handguns).
173. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (arguing that figures for R.G. Industries
handguns sold and number of R.G. Industries handguns used in crime do not support Kelley
court's findings).
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primarily in the perpetration of crime, the Kelley court cited a student law
review article, which concluded that most Saturday Night Specials are, in
fact, used in crime. 74 The law review article cited by the Kelley court
attributes the conclusion that people most often use a Saturday Night Special
for criminal purposes to a statement by Senator Edward Kennedy supporting
congressional legislation to ban the sale of Saturday Night Specials.'7 The
congressional record, however, does not contain any statement of Senator
Kennedy that directly supports the article's conclusion.'
76
The Kelley court also offered the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in
Moning v. Alfano' 77 as support for the Kelley court's finding that Saturday
Night Special manufacturers and distributors ought to know that purchasers
most often use their products in the perpetration of crime.'17 In Moning, the
Michigan Supreme Court found that a jury question existed concerning the
liability of a manufacturer of ten-cent slingshots to an injured bystander
because the Michigan court concluded that a jury reasonably could find that
misuse of the product by children was foreseeable. m Courts have questioned
the extension of the Moning decision to products marketed to anyone but
children.180 One court also has questioned the extension of the Moning
decision to other states because the Michigan Supreme Court decided the
case by a three-two vote with two justices not participating. 8 Moreover, a
California court considering a similar action by a child injured under
substantially the same circumstances as in Moning, refused to impose strict
liability upon the manufacturer or distributor. 82 According to the California
174. 304 Md. at 154-56, 497 A.2d at 1158-59; see Note, Common-Law Approach, supra
note 5, at 791-92 (arguing that Saturday Night Specials are useless except to criminals and that
people most often use Saturday Night Specials for criminal purposes).
175. See Note, supra note 5, at 791 n.124 (citing remarks of Sen. Kennedy as support for
conclusion that purchasers most often use Saturday Night Specials in criminal activity).
176. See 127 CoNG. RiEc. § 7118, 7119 (1981) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (record is void
of any assertion by Sen. Kennedy that people most often use Saturday Night Specials in criminal
activity). Senator Kennedy has stated that many criminals rely on Saturday Night Specials in
perpetrating crime and that Saturday Night Specials are meant to maim or kill. Id.
177. 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977).
178. 304 Md. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159.
179. 400 Mich. at 446-49, 254 N.W.2d at 769-70.
180. See Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 I11. App.2d 642,_., 477 N.E.2d
1293, 1296 (1985) (Moning decision did not support plaintiff's claim that injury from marketing
of handguns was foreseeable because court found Moning decision limited to products marketed
directly to children); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 I11. App.3d 676,-, 469 N.E.2d 339,
340 (1984) (court found that Moning decision did not support plaintiff's claim that manufacturer
had duty to control distribution of handguns because Moning decision limited to products
marketed directly to children); see also Note, supra note 7, at 1920 (Moning decision not
accepted universally and not easily extended).
181. See Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App.3d 676,_.., 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (1984)
(questioning precedential value of Moning outside of Michigan).
182. See Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App.3d 930, 933, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483,
484 (1976) (rejecting recovery to child injured by toy slingshot in suit against slingshot's
manufacturer and distributor). In Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., a child injured another
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court, because imposing strict liability on the toy slingshot manufacturer or
distributor would result in a ban on toy slingshots in California by judicial
fiat, the court properly must leave the decision to ban toy slingshots to the
California legislature.' 8 A further problem exists in the Kelley court's reliance
upon Moning because the Michigan Supreme Court in Moning relied on
risk/utility analysis to impose liability upon the manufacturer although the
slingshot that fired the injuring projectile did not malfunction. 84 The Kelley
court, in an earlier portion of its decision, had rejected risk/utility analysis
in situations in which the product in question did not malfunction .
85
Despite the shortcomings that the opinion in Kelley arguably contains,
other authority adds some support for the finding that Saturday Night
Special manufacturers and distributors ought to know that purchasers use
their products principally for criminal purposes. 8 6 A 1976-1977 study con-
ducted by the United States Department of Justice surveyed police depart-
ments in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. to determine the
characteristics of weapons used in crime that police had confiscated. 87 Of
significant importance was the Department of Justice's findings that more
than two-thirds of all handguns used in each category of violent crime
surveyed, including homicides, robberies, and assaults, were handguns with
a barrel length of three inches or less. 8 8 This finding is important because
less than half of all handguns manufactured or imported in 1974 had barrel
lengths of three inches or less,'89 and at least one commentator has pointed
out that two-thirds of all handguns in the cities surveyed likely were not
child when a projectile from a toy slingshot hit the second child. Id. at 933, 133 Cal. Rptr. at
484. The parents of the injured child sued the marketer and manufacturer of the toy slingshot
claiming that the manufacturer and distributor of the toy slingshot was strictly liable because
the injury to the child was foreseeable. Id.
183. Id. at 933, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
184. See Moning, 400 Mich. at 446-49, 254 N.W.2d at 767-70 (invoking risk/utility analysis
to test plaintiff's negligent distribution claim against toy slingshot manufacturer although
slingshot performed without malfunction).
185. See 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149 (rejecting risk/utility analysis when product
that is subject of products liability claim has not malfunctioned).
186. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text (asserting that some authority was
available to support Kelley court's holding).
187. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FIREARMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONCEN-
TRATED URBAN ENFORCEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF INITIAL YEAR OF OPERATION CUE IN THE CITIES
OF WASHINGTON, D.C., BOSTON, MA., CHICAGO, IL. 96-98 (1977) (study of guns confiscated by
police departments in three metropolitan areas from February 1976 to May 1977) [hereinafter
cited as CONCENTRATED URBAN ENFORCEMENT].
188. See id. at 96-98. In the District of Columbia, of the handguns seized by police, 67%
of homicide handguns, 65% of robbery handguns, and 69% of assault handguns had barrel
lengths of three inches or less. Id. In Chicago, handguns with barrel lengths of three inches or
less comprised 73% of homicide handguns, 72% of robbery handguns, and 76% of assault
handguns seized by police. Id. In Boston, handguns with barrel lengths of three inches or less
comprised 61% of homicide handguns, 60% of robbery handguns, and 76% of assault handguns
seized by police between February 1976 and May 1977. Id.
189. Cook, supra note 117, at 1743.
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handguns with barrel lengths of three inches or shorter.,9o Therefore, hand-
guns with short barrels are involved in a disproportionately high amount of
violent crime in several major cities.19'
The Department of Justice study also included data concerning the retail
price of the weapons confiscated by police in the three urban areas sur-
veyed.' 92 Approximately forty percent of all handguns seized retailed for less
than fifty dollars. 93 Although comprehensive data is not available concerning
the percentage of handguns that sell for less than fifty dollars at retail,
handguns that retail for less than fifty dollars likely do not comprise forty
percent of the handgun market. 94 The low price of Saturday Night Specials
suggests that manufacturers and distributors ought to know that purchasers
more often use these handguns in criminal activity than handguns retailing
at a higher price. '91 According to several commentators, persons who ordinarily
could not afford an expensive handgun commit a disproportionate share of
violent crimes.' 9 Handguns marketed at a low price, therefore, bear an in-
creased likelihood that purchasers will use the handguns in connection with
criminal activity.'97 Although the Kelly court's support for the finding that
Saturday Night Special manufacturers ought to know that their products have
no legitimate use and are attractive only to criminals was weak, the Maryland
court's conclusion was not wholly unsubstantiated.' 98
190. See id. (handguns of three inches or less likely did not comprise two-thirds of handguns
in cities surveyed by federal study).
191. See CONCENTRATED URBAN ENFORCEMENT, supra note 187, at 96-98 (finding that two-
thirds of all handguns confiscated by police for involvement in homicides, robberies, and
assaults were handguns with barrel length three inches or less); Cook, supra note 117, at 1743
(small handguns predominate in violent crime in urban areas).
192. See CONCENTRATED URBAN ENFORCEMENT, supra note 187, at 96-98 (finding that
nearly 40% of handguns seized by police in 1976-77 in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Boston
retailed for less than $50).
193. Id.
194. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1743-44 (no data available concerning number of
handguns that sell for less than $50); W. JARRETT, SHOOTR'S BIBLE 100-69 (1986) (of handguns
listed, including R.G. Industries handguns, few retail used or new for under $50); S. LEWIS,
GUN DIGEST'S BOOK OF MODERN GUN VALUES 12-96 (4th ed. 1983) (same); R. QUERTERMOUS &
S. QUERTERMOUS, MODERN GUN VALUES 336-446 (5th ed. 1985) (same).
195. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1740 (arguing that low price of Saturday Night Specials
permit purchase by persons who are most likely to use handgun in criminal activity and generally
unable to purchase expensive handgun).
196. L. CURTIS, CRIMINAL. VIOLENCE 119-51 (1974) (asserting that persons with lower
incomes commit disproportionate share of violent crime); Cook, supra note 117, at 1740
(arguing that low price of Saturday Night Specials permit purchase by persons who are most
likely to use handgun in criminal activity and generally unable to purchase expensive handgun).
197. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1740 (arguing that setting high minimum price for
handguns effectively would reduce availability of handguns to groups of persons most likely to
use handguns in criminal activity).
198. See Teret & Wintermute, Handgun Injuries: The Epidemiologic Evidence for Assessing
Legal Responsibility, 6 HAMLINE L. Rv. 341, 350 (1983) (handgun manufacturers and distrib-
utors are chargeable with knowledge of epidemiological data demonstrating foreseeability of
harm caused by criminal use of handguns); see also supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text
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A major objection to the Kelley court's opinion is that the creation of a
cause of action in strict liability against Saturday Night Special manufacturers
and distributors will result in a ban of Saturday Night Specials by judicial
fiat. .99 Some commentators suggest that a court properly should not allow
strict liability recovery against manufacturers and distributors of handguns
subsequently used in crime because only the legislature should act on political
questions such as the utility or disutility of handguns. 2°° Contrary to the
arguments disfavoring a judicial ruling on the value of handguns, some
courts and commentators suggest that a ban of handguns is not the necessary
product of a finding of strict liability against a manufacturer or distributor
of a handgun used in crime °. 2 0 Instead, a finding of strict liability may permit
handguns to retail at their "real" price, the price that accounts for the
societal cost of the handguns. 202 The argument is that the price of handguns
will reflect the cost to society in lost labor, exorbitant medical expenses, and
increased law enforcement expenses only if manufacturers and distributors
are liable to victims of handgun crime. 203 Instead of discontinuing the
(asserting that results of Department of Justice study adds support to Kelley court's claim that
Saturday Night Special manufacturers ought to know that people use their products principally
in criminal activity).
199. See Dorr & Burch, supra note 108, at 12 (by subjecting Saturday Night Special
manufacturers to strict liability for intentional criminal use of their products, Kelley court
establishes ban of Saturday Night Specials by judicial fiat); cf. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762
F.2d 1250, 1269 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding of strict liability for criminal use of handguns would
result in ban of handguns by judicial fiat); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208
(N.D. Tex. 1985) (same); Mavilia v. Stoeger Industr., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983)
(same).
200. See Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (emotional
issue of handgun control is properly addressed only by legislature); Rhodes v. R.G. Industr.,
Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51,_....., 325 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1984) (court is powerless to recognize cause
of action against handgun manufacturer for wrongful death without legislative mandate); see
also Dorr & Burch, supra note 108, at 14-15 (asserting that Kelley court wrongfully acted as
legislative body by recognizing cause of action against Saturday Night Special manufacturers
and distributors); Santarelli & Calio, supra note 4, at 505-06 (shifting liability for injuries
resulting from handgun crime is legislative issue beyond courts' authority); Note, supra note 7,
at 1924-27 (judiciary is ill-equipped to resolve handgun abuse problem).
201. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (asserting that imposition of strict liability on manufacturers of
handguns used in crime is not attempt to ban handguns by judicial fiat); Note, supra note 151,
at 184 (asserting that finding of strict liability will not place undue hardship on handgun
distributors because liability will force manufacturers to produce better handguns to protect distribu-
tors from liability).
202. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (arguing that imposition of strict liability is not attempt to ban
handguns but effort to place inherent costs of handguns on users rather than victims); Note,
Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 GEo. L.J.
1437, 1438 (1985) (imposition of strict liability on handgun manufacturers and distributors
would force rise in retail price of handguns to reflect true cost of handguns to society).
203. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (marketing of handguns presents duty to marketer to bear'costs of
doing business, including compensation to innocent victims); Note, supra note 202, at 1453-62
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production and distribution of handguns, manufacturers and distributors
may raise the price of their products to reflect their increased insurance
premiums and legal fees.2°4 In turn, the higher price of the handguns may
make handguns less affordable to criminals.
205
Courts properly cannot hold manufacturers and distributors of handguns
strictly liable to persons injured through the criminal use of their products
under either an abnormally dangerous activity or traditional products liability
theory.? Based upon the Kelley decision, however, Maryland courts now
recognize an action against Saturday Night Special manufacturers and dis-
tributors because of their products' attractiveness to criminals and because
no legitimate uses for the handguns exist. 20 7 The new cause of action in
Maryland provides relief to a victim of a criminal shooting if a jury
determines that the weapon was a Saturday Night Special.208 The probable
success of a claim under this new cause of action is clouded, however,
because the precise definition of a Saturday Night Special remains unclear. 209
Although some courts object to expanding strict liability concepts if the
innovation likely will cause a judicial ban of a product, the Maryland Court
of Appeals' decision in Kelley may prompt the Maryland legislature to
address the problems posed by small, inexpensive firearms in the hands of
criminals. 210 The Maryland Court of Appeals' solution to the problems posed
by Saturday Night Specials is to impose strict liability upon those parties
responsible for placing the distinct class of handguns on the streets. 21 ,
(imposition of strict liability on handgun manufacturers will raise price of handguns adequately
to reflect full costs of buying and using handguns).
204. See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (consumers ultimately will bear cost associated with producing and
marketing handguns if courts impose strict liability on handgun manufacturers and distributors);
Note, supra note 202 at 1458 (strict liability appropriately may force purchasers of handguns
to pay more, enabling manufacturers and distributors of handguns to insure against potential
criminal use of their products).
205. See Cook, supra note 117, at 1740 (increasing price of handguns is effective means
of reducing availability of handguns to criminals).
206. See supra notes 16-52 and accompanying text (rejecting strict liability claims against
manufacturers and distributors of handguns subsequently used in crime under abnormally
dangerous activity theories); supra notes 53-99 and accompanying text (rejecting strict liability
claims-against manufacturers and distributors of handguns subsequently used in crime under un-
reasonably dangerous products theory).
207. 304 Md. at 144-61, 497 A.2d at 1153-61; see supra notes 100-205 (discussing Kelley
court's recognition of cause of action against Saturday Night Special manufacturers and
distributors).
208. 304 Md. at 157-59, 497 A.2d at 1159-60.
209. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text (Kelly court did not provide clear
guidelines for classifying handgun as Saturday Night Special).
210. Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985) (providing that courts cannot find that
manufacturer defectively designed handgun based upon finding that risks of firearm outweigh
social utility); Note, supra note 151, at 171 (California Legislature enacted CAL. Civ. CODE §
1714.4 (West 1985) in response to risk/utility test for design defects described in Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co.).
211. See 304 Md. at 144-61, 497 A.2d at 1153-61 (establishing strict liability cause of action
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Although the Kelley court proffered weak evidence to support the finding
that Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors ought to know
that purchasers use Saturday Night Specials principally in criminal activity,
courts properly can charge the manufacturers and distributors with knowl-
edge of the injuries inflicted with their products. 2 12 Unless and until the state
legislatures or Congress decides to adopt legislation that addresses the
problem posed by cheap, concealable handguns, by banning the sale of
Saturday Night Specials or otherwise, American courts properly should
consider holding Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors
strictly liable for injuries resulting from products that the manufacturers
design and market principally for criminal use. 213 Any theory of liability
devised by a court to hold manufacturers and distributors of handguns liable
for the use of their products in criminal activity, however, requires a better
legal foundation than that proffered by the Kelley court.
2 4
TYLER P. BROWN
against Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors); supra notes 100-205 and
accompanying text (discussing Kelley court's recognition of cause of action against Saturday
Night Special manufacturers and distributors).
212. See Teret & Wintermute, supra note 198, at 350 (arguing that abundance of studies
linking firearms with tremendous health impact allows court to charge handgun manufacturers
and distributors with knowledge and foreseeability of criminal activity); supra notes 164-85 and
accompanying text (arguing that Kelley court's support for finding that purchasers most often
use Saturday Night Specials in criminal activity was weak).
213. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (Saturday Night Specials are useless
for legitimate uses and are attractive to criminals).
214. See supra notes 165-85 and accompanying text (authority cited by Kelley court in
finding that Saturday Night Special manufacturers and distributors ought to know that people
use their products principally for criminal activity was weak).
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